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SURVEYS FOR SENSITIVITY TO FIBERS 
AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS FROM FIBER 
INDUCED FAILURES 
A. J. Butterfield 
The Bionetics Corporation 
The surveys for sensitivities to fibers and potential impacts 
from fiber induced failures begins with a review of the survey work 
completed to date and then describes an impact study involving 
four industrial installations located in the Virginia - southeast 
area. The observations and results from both the surveys and the 
study provide guidelines for future efforts. 
The surveys have been performed by a number of teams working 
more or less together. Figures 1 and 2 summarize the status of 
surveys conducted to date. 
The survey work was done with three broad objectives: 
1. Identify the pieces of potentially vulnerable equipment 
as candidates for test. 
2. Support the transfer function work by gaining an un- 
derstanding of how fibers could get into a building. 
3. Support the economic analysis by understanding what would 
happen if fibers precipitated a failure in an item of equipment. 
The surveys completed to date have covered both commercial and 
public service installations. Figure 1 begins with hospitals where 
the Hill-Burton Act sets the requirements for a hospital to receive 
federal aid. The Hill-Burton specifications define a minimum level 
of air filtration for operating rooms, cardiac care units, and in- 
tensive care units in terms of a triple filtration system: a pre 
filter; a secondary filter: and the last stage as a high efficiency 
(HEPA) filter. The rest of the equipment in a hospital correlates 
to electronic items in general use throughout the rest of the 
country. Hospitals live with a lint environment: therefore hospi- 
tal equipment tends to have good covers. Life critical equipment 
appears well protected. 
For air traffic control, the surveys included the tower and 
area traffic control centers outside of Boston plus the Washington 
National Tower. The radars, the control rooms, the IFR rooms, and 
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all the pieces of equipment necessary to handle an airplane in the 
air have air conditioning with good filtration and in most cases, 
each item of equipment has a good enclosure or case. 
The passenger areas of a terminal must control jet engine 
fumes. Each terminal handles the problem differently. Dallas - 
Ft. Worth uses positive pressure: Boston uses activated carbon. 
The surveys found air conditioning with extra filtration or some 
means that would tend to minimize the ingestion of carbon fibers. 
Reservation systems generally have open electronic equipment and 
depend upon the air conditioning system for protection. 
Airline operations equipment includes the computers and the 
communication elements by which an airline schedules its airplanes, 
schedules its maintenance, and schedules its own internal opera- 
tions. These functions receive their protection from air condi- 
tioning since most of the equipment tends to be open. Potentially 
vulnerable items have been identified and are candidates for test. 
Reviews of this particular area found power failure as the prin- 
cipal problem. Most have some kind of emergency power system; and 
Boston generally has to call on emergency power about four times 
a year. Hangars are open. In the servicing of aircraft, equip- 
ment can become exposed; however, sensitive pieces of equipment 
have protective covers which tend to minimize the ingestion of 
fibers. The lists have now defined those items which are open and 
do need testing. 
For telephone exchanges (Figure 21, the other big user of 
electronics, the surveys included central offices and one military 
base. Here, the range of equipment runs from fairly old to the 
most modern of electronics. Some exchanges have better protection 
than others. The surveys have identified a composite list of po- 
tentially vulnerable equipment. Some of the patch boards and pass- 
through circuitry that the telephone company uses appear potentially 
quite sensitive. Some of that equipment finds its way into airport 
equipment rooms and control towers. In such a case, should the 
integrity of the tower be violated, it would probably be the tele- 
phone items in the ground communication equipment that would suffer 
first. 
The post office uses digital equipment in cancelling and sort- 
ing mail. Some show reasonable protection; however, the facility 
surveyed had elevator shafts, roller doors, and windows such that 
fibers could enter. The impact would be a return to hand sorting 
if the equipment were down for an extended period of time. 
Traffic light controllers show a similarity to telephone equip- 
ment: they range from simple items to sophisticated equipment. 
The combination of air flows, filtration and design features elim- 
inates these items as a problem. 
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Radio stations have their studio areas divided into small 
rooms for isolation. This limits the ingestion of fibers;however, 
a fair amount of dust does get into the electronics. The field 
survey found one transmitter that was an open building; newer 
transmitters are moving away from open construction. 
The digital electronics manufacturer'protects the manufactur- 
ing areas by air filtration and operates the building at a positive 
pressure. Control computers are installed in a room-within-a-room. 
If they lost their air conditioning system and their air filtration, 
the economic impact would be the cost of cleaning any open equipment. 
At the present time,survey efforts are considered completed for 
hospitals, air traffic controls and traffic light controllers. 
The last four industries were surveyed in detail to look at 
the possible effects of a fiber release incident. In addition to 
the general objectives which guided all the survey efforts, the 
impact study carried the three special objectives as listed in 
figure 3. This particular effort received cooperation and hospi- 
tality from four major industrial installations located in the Vir- 
ginia - southeast area. The basis for their selection was diversity 
in product coupled with a dependence upon electrical equipment 
throughout the manufacturing sequences. 
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As listed in figure 4, the study used six steps to make the 
detailed estimate of impact. The first step was aimed at under- 
standing what went on inside that factory. The second step sought 
out the vulnerable equipment and looked at what would happen in 
the event of a failure. The third step clothed the failure inci- 
dents with dollar costs. Step four drew from the information on 
ventilation to define transfer functions that would show the kind 
of barriers in the way of a carbon fiber entering the building. 
Step five became a scenario for a carbon fiber release incident 
plus the use of established mathematics to estimate a probability 
for failure. Step six multiplied the values from step five and 
step three to get the impact summary. This study is presently 
on-going, therefore one plant will serve as an example to show the 
method and then be compared to the other three. 
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate Step 1. These diagrams show a mod- 
ern factory powered by four large transformers. All four work to- 
gether in one room. The factory operates three independent lines 
with each line producing one component. The electronic component 
is sophisticated; the line has all the classical elements of a mod- 
ern electronic fabrication facility. They make their own circuit 
boards and use numerical controlled equipment to drill the holes 
in the circuit boards. The circuit assembly process uses automated 
techniques; digital controlled devices place the resistors and ca- 
pacitors into the circuit boards: and hand stuffing completes the 
IMPACT STUDY METHOD AND EXAMPLES 
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Figure 4 
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Figure 6 
population. Digital equipment performs inspection sequences. This 
particular circuit is balanced by very precise,laser trimmed re- 
sistors. The values of the resistors are defined using digital 
equipment; the resistors are trimmed using digital equipment. The 
assembled units are conditioned by a thermal cycle burn-in as with 
any high quality electronic component. 
In assessing vulnerability, the electronic component has 
coated circuit boards and is not considered vulnerable. The elec- 
tronic equipment depends upon air conditioning filters and cabinet 
filters for protection. Therefore the electronic component line 
and the air cooled transformers show a degree of vulnerability. 
Figure 6 diagrams the other two lines, one is a machining line 
for an electromechanical unit built to close tolerance. The ma- 
chining is done in a separated area and the equipment operates in 
the spray from the cutting fluids. Assembly has to be done under 
very closely controlled environmental conditions. This particular 
unit has to be operated, adjusted, and calibrated, all using digi- 
tal test equipment. On the automated machining line, computers do 
the sequencing and controlling of the steps during both machining 
and assembly. In looking at the kinds of protections, the computers 
in the automated line are also working in the spray from the cut- 
ting machines or in the dust from the lubricants used during as- 
sembly. Filters which remove mist or stray lubricant will not pass 
fibers. The filtration within clean rooms employs HEPA type fil- 
ters which do not pass fibers. These two lines do not show a vul- 
nerability to fibers. 
The comparison to the other three factories must consider the 
diversity intended in the selection for product and mode of opera- 
tions. Figure 7 compares the characteristics of the four factories. 
The assembly of televisions included a limited amount of fab- 
rication, mostly plastic molding, together with a number of moving 
belt assembly iines. Each television chassis size has a dedicated 
assembly line which can accommodate different cabinetry and dif- 
ferent small features from set to set. The assembly of light 
trucks employs one large integrated line which can accommodate 
every option that can go into a pickup truck from vehicle to ve- 
hicle. The production of textile fibers requires a dedicated line 
which runs continuously seven days a week around the clock., This 
plant has another product, nylon with a conductive carbon coat. 
This material is used for control of static electricity in carpets. 
In comparing the factories, the first two are "all under one 
roofU type of operations. The truck assembly plant is about 50 
years old and has a main assembly building plus warehouses and a 
separate building to house the air compressors and steam boilers. 
The fiber producer employs separate buildings for processing lines, 
for spinning of yarn and for the coating of nylon. 
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IMPACT STUDY 
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Figure 8 compares some of the pertinent features of the four 
industrial installations. The power systems showed both points of 
diversity and elements of commonality. Transformers were located 
in different places, many of them indoors, some clustered together, 
some of them outdoors; and they employed different means for cool- 
ing; but there was one commonality. All installations used a 13.2 
kV inlet, all had air cooled high voltage switches. In the case 
of the television factory, the cooling was secondary air flowing 
around sealed cases. The automotive plant and the fiber plant had 
the air cooled switches enclosed in outdoor type cabinets, louvered 
inlets, vents at the top of the case, over-hanging roof for rain 
protection. Outside air circulates through this type of cabinet. 
The 440 volt power equipment showed a diversity which re- 
flected the product of the plant. The television plant has to heat 
plastics, the automotive plant has to weld, the fiber plant has to 
control the speeds of the line. They achieve control by driving 
a motor generator to produce a variable frequency. Variable fre- 
quency 440 volt induction motors along the line will then all run 
in step. 
440 volt motors appear as the common denominator for all in- 
dustry. They are running in the spray and mist of a machining 
operation: they are hanging from the ceilings to drive an over- 
head conveyor: they are buried under the floors to drive moving 
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IMPACT STUDY 
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belt conveyors: and they are mounted over chemical vats to drive 
process lines. At the present time, tests have shown that 110 volt 
motors are not a problem, and 220 volt motors should be the same. 
However, 440 volts is in the range which can create a sustaining 
arc; and considering the wide usage, the vulnerability of 440 volt 
motors must be defined by test. 
The ventilation systems reflect the needs of the product. 
Precision assembly and the fabrication of electronics benefit from 
closed buildings with filtered air conditioning. The assembly of 
automobiles has a dust-critical operation during spray painting. 
The heat and vapors from a chemical process dissipate more readily 
from an open building. 
Figures 9 and 10 illustrate Step 2 which employs an adaptation 
of the fault tree concept. This step first identifies any possibly 
vulnerable item of equipment and then describes what would happen 
in the event of a fiber induced failure. The results of the fail- 
ure are then presented in terms which would permit establishing a 
cost. 
For instance if a power transformer were to fail, it would 
probably stop some of the lines, but offices would not go dark and 
the maintenance people could work. In such a case, the considera- 
tions would become: Would it be necessary to furlough people? 
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Would machine stoppage spoil product? Would start-up require 
clearing the machines and reprograming some computers? And, fin- 
ally, in the case of a plant which supplies another assembly line, 
would they have to recover their schedule? 
For some of the other items (Figure lo), the situation is a 
little different. The considerations include spoiled batches 
and the time required to trouble shoot or repair; meanwhile there 
would be lost time for the operators. A prolonged down time of 
a piece of equipment could starve the rest of the assembly line 
or at least reduce the capability for production. 
Figure 11 compares the potentially vulnerable equipment with- 
in the four factories. For power, the common use of air cooled 
switches both indoors and outdoors appears vulnerable. For the 
440 volt equipment, some work reported by the Navy has shown that 
440 volt buses with air ventilation can create a sustaining arc 
and burn up; a similar situation may exist in large 440 volt motors 
with open windings. In the textile fiber plant, the frequency con- 
verter appears potentially vulnerable. 
For low voltage analog types of equipment,the vulnerability of 
temperature controllers has been recognized. The television plant 
has two areas of concern. A television set has to be aligned and 
tuned to the frequencies of the commercial stations. This requires 
IMPACT STUDY 
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an oscillator to generate the test signals and circuitry to support 
operations on the assembly lines. At any time during assembly, a 
number of television sets operate with their cases open; under 
such conditions there is some vulnerable product. The assembly of 
automotive sheet metal relies on spot welding; the welding timers 
operate exposed with uncoated circuit boards. These units must be 
considered vulnerable. 
Low voltage digital equipment has an identified vulnerability. 
The automotive industry appears to be expanding the use of digital 
controlled robotic manipulators within the welding operations. In 
addition, teletype printer stations throughout the factory provide 
the means for achieving integration across the entire assembly pro- 
cess. 
Figure 12 compares the potential impact of a fiber induced 
failure within types of vulnerable equipment. The failure of a 
power switch would halt manufacturing in one plant, halt assembly 
in another and, in the textile plant, it would shut down one or 
more lines. The 440 volt equipment has the same capability for 
impact. Low voltage equipment does not show quite the potential 
for impact; however, line stoppage is still a significant expense. 
IMPACT STUDY 
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As shown in figure 13, the first step in the estimation of a 
cost requires defining how a factory would respond to a failure: 
and there seemed to be no common way these factories would re- 
spond. The factory supplying another assembly line would prob- 
ably have to recover the delivery schedules. A factory that main- 
tained an inventory supply may elect to defer any catch-up of pro- 
duction. A continuous operating plant does not have much flexibil- 
ity for improving delivery or recovering lost production. The loss 
terms were converted to costs expressed as lost labor hours, num- 
ber of product lost, and estimates of materials involved. The con- 
version to dollars used data that came from such sources as Chamber 
of Commerce publications, Industrial Association publications and 
to the extent practical,data from the Bureau of the Census. A 
national estimate for an economic impact on industry must find a 
way to use census data. 
As shown in figure 14, the transfer function took the simplest 
practical approach. The A. D. Little Company, during previous work, 
had devised an equation for the transfer function based on filter 
efficiencies and the relative ventilation flow rates throughout the 
factory. This equation was considered adequate for the purposes of 
this study. The transfer function appears as a product with one 
term which describes the factory and the other term which describes 
the cabinet that houses the electronics. 
IMPACT STUDY METHOD AND EXAMPLES 
STEP 3, ESTIMATION F A COST 
l DEFINE AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE-TO-FAILURE ACTION. 
. ESTIMATE THE CORRESPONDING IMPACT FOR EACH ITEM OF EQUIPMENT AND EACH 
LOSS CONSIDERATION IN TERMS OF: LABOR HOURS; PRODUCT; MATERIALS. 
l CONVERT TODOLLARS USING AVAILABLE PUBLISHED DATA. 
Figure 13 
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IMPACT STUDY METHOD AND EXAMPLES 
STEP 4, TRANSFER FUNCTION, ASSUMPTIONS: 
.ACCEPT THE ADL EQUATION BASED UPON VENTILATION PARAMETERS AND FILTER 
EFFICIENCIES, 
TRANSFER FUNCTION = 
RELATIVE FLOW RATES: FILTER EFFICIENCIES: 
Q = INFILTRATION NI INLET FILTER 
M = MAKE UP NR RECIRCULATION FILTER 
R = RECIRCULATION NC CABINET FILTER 
,ASHRAE DUST SPOT EFFICIENCIES CORRELATE TO FIBER EFFICIENCIES: 
ASHRAE % FIBER % ASHRAE % FIBER % 
10-35 90 45-80 9805 
35-40 97 80-90 99 
40-45 98 
Figure 14 
Other work reported by the A. D. Little Company indicated that 
air conditioning filters showed a correlation between the efficiency 
for stopping fibers and the efficiency as rated by the ASHRAE dust 
spot method. As interpolated from the published data, the values 
shown represent the efficiencies for removing fibers as correlations 
to the efficiencies measured by dust spot ratings. The assumption 
is limited to just those kinds of filter materials used in indus- 
trial installations. 
Figure 15 outlines the assumptions used to calculate the prob- 
ability for a failure. The equation shown assumes the failure is 
precipitated by a single fiber. The values selected for E become 
the best estimates extracted from existing test data. 
exposure of lo5 
The outside 
fiber seconds per cubic meter represents an esti- 
mate for a median fiber release incident. 
Figure 16 shows the kinds of results appearing after pre- 
liminary calculations. Relative to the transfer functions, the 
value Shown for the transformer/l3 kV switch represents the basic 
air conditioning system. The populator has air conditioning plus 
a cabinet filter. Acceptance test represents a room-within-a-room 
with precise temperature control. The chamber control relfects 
air conditioning plus a tight cabinet. 
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IMPACT STUDY METHOD AND EXAMPLE 
STEP 5 ESTIMATE A PROBABILITY FOR FAILURE 
' PROBABILITY OF FAILURE = 1 _ ,-EiIE 
Ei = EXPOSURE 
i = AVERAGE EXPOSURE TO CAUSE A FAILURE (TEST DATA) 
o ASSUME A FIBER RELEASE INCIDENT RESULTING IN AN OUTSIDE EXPOSURE OF 105 
THEN, Ei = T,F (105) 
STEP 6 IMPACT PRODUCT 
(PROBABILITY) X (COST ESTIMATE) 
Figure 15 
IMPACT STUDY METHOD AND EXAMPLE 
CALCULATION ASSUMING AN EXPOSURE OF lo5 
ELEMENT 
TRANSFORMER 
(13 KV SWITCH) 
POPULATOR 
(COMPUTER) 
ACCEPTANCE 
TEST 
CHAMBER 
CONTROL 
TRANSFER PROBABILITY 
FUNCTION F OF FAILURE 
3.2 X 10-2 105 684 X 1O-2 
3.0 x 10-4 106 la2 x 10-4 
2.2 x 10-5 106 1.4 x 10-5 
602 X 1O-4 107 6,2 X 1D-6 
Figure 16 
FAILURE 
EST. COST 
$8 X 104 
$4 x 102 
$4 x 102 
$4 x 104 
IMPACT 
PRODUCT 
S 5,2 X lo3 
$ 4,9 x 10-2 
$ 5,5 x 10-s 
$ 285 X 10-l 
I . 
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For the E values listed, the chamber control reflects a gen- 
eral knowledge of typical units. The lo6 values correlate to test 
results on typical computers employed in such installations. The 
value listed for the transformer/l3 kV switch is an engineering 
estimate. The values shown for the probability of failure include 
the effects of a multiple installation where a failure in any one 
unit could produce the estimated cost. 
In assessing costs, clearing a failure within a computer does 
not incur a large penalty particularly if companion units do not 
fail (only one failure in a group). Loss of a half day of produc- 
tion during a thermal excursion has a significant cost impact. A 
power failure which halts manufacture has a major impact. 
The consequence of a power failure persists into the impact 
product and result in the only significant value. The costs associ- 
ated with a half day of production are offset by the low probabil- 
ity for a chamber control failure to cause a thermal runaway. 
The findings from the study as listed in figure 17 show that 
failures within power equipment have the potential for causing the 
kinds of economic impact associated with the shut-down of a factory. 
Low voltage equipment can fail and cause a significant economic 
impact such as loss of a half days production. Fortunately, the 
IMPACT STUDY FINDINGS 
OBSERVATIONS FROM THE STUDY: 
POWER: ONLY FAILURES WITHIN POWER EQUIPMENT SHOW A POTENTIAL FOR MAJOR 
ECONOMIC IMPACT, 
LOW WIDE USAGE IN IMPORTANT APPLICATIONS, 
VOLTAGE: FAILURES COULD HAVE SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC IMPACT, 
PROTECTIONS: FILTERS AND CABINETS IN-USE APPEAR TO PROVIDE ORDERS-OF-MAGNITUDE 
BUFFERING, 
Figure 17 
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present protections Of air conditioning and good cabinets moderate 
any chances for failure. 
Figure 18 summarizes the results from the surveys relative to 
further effort. The areas of hospitals and air traffic control 
30 not seem to have a problem. For other essential service equip- 
ilent, the surveys have generated candidate lists of items for test. 
Industry cost modeling requires more data. Future work must look 
at high voltage and 440 volt equipment first. Test data must in- 
clude a wider range of filter media, since industry uses a corre- 
spondingly wide range. There is a need for a correlation to other 
xonomic data such as provided by the Bureau of the Census. There- 
fore, surveys must continue toward developing a method for relating 
Lo the bulk of federal data. The DOE has a test plan to evaluate 
iigh voltage equipment and requires the coordinating of information 
such that areas of concern do receive evaluation by test. Finally 
ihe current test program for vulnerability and for filter transfer 
.qill require a continuing liaison toward updating candidate lists 
in the light of new data. 
CONCLUSIONS A DRESULTS FROM THE SURVEYS 
APPLIED TO FUTURE COST RISK ASSESSMENT FFORTS 
1, HOSPITAL AND AIR TRAFFIC ONTROL EQUIPMENT APPEAR TO HAVE GOOD 
PROTECTION. 
2, SURVEYS OF ESSENTIAL SERVICE QUIPMENT HAVE IDENTIFIED POTENTIALLY 
VULNERABLE IT MS. 
3, COST IMPACT MODELING FOR INDUSTRY NOT COMPLETE; DATA FROM SURVEYS 
AND TESTS NEEDED TO: 
o DEFINE VULNERABILITIES OF HIGH VOLTAGE AND 440 V EQUIPMENT 
o CHARACTERIZE FILTER EFFICIENCIES AND TRANSFER FUNCTIONS 
o ESTABLISH A CORRELATION T  OTHER ECONOMIC DATA 
4, ACTIONS INDICATED: 
o PLAN AND CONDUCT ADDITIONAL SURVEYS 
o COORDINATE WITH DOE IN THE TEST PLANNING FOR HIGH VOLTAGE EQUIPMENT 
o EVALUATE R SULTS FROM ON GOING TESTS 
Figure 18 
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Pertinent Questions and Answers 
(1) Question: 
Have any surveys looked at nuclear or other electrical gener- 
ating stations for effects on control rooms or vulnerable equip- 
ment? 
Answer: 
No visits have been made to any electric power plants; the 
DOE is charged with that responsibility. In a review of the re- 
quirements for nuclear plants, their specifications consider 
seismic effects, and they also require the capability to seal 
the control rooms such that they become self-sustaining entities 
in the event of an emergency. Control of power plants does not 
appear as a problem. 
There is no definitive data to show what happens when fibers 
get into an area that is concentration critical, here the presence 
of fibers can distort the electric field. These effects are part 
of the reasoning behind the DOE test program. There has been some 
work done by BRL, by the Navy, and by other agencies: they have 
identified the principal areas of uncertainty. 
(2) Question: 
What did the airport surveys find for landing aids such as 
glideslope transmitters and similar equipment? 
Answer: 
These items are usually located out along the runways in a 
sealed building or at least with filtered air. The electronics 
are mounted in closed or sealed cases. They do not appear as a 
problem. 
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